Who Sits in the Room: Selecting and Coordinating the Board and Special CommitteePart 3 of a series on the Fairness Doctrine in corporate transactions
Author’s note. I am a CPA, ABV and CFF, not an attorney. The legal principles referenced below reflect my experience working alongside transaction counsel as a valuation advisor, fairness opinion provider, director, and special committee member, not independent legal research. They are included to frame practical board decisions, not to provide legal advice. Readers should consult their own corporate counsel about how these principles apply to their specific facts and governing law.
Two promises, and where this article starts
Article 1 promised that this installment would turn to the role of special committees, and how they utilize corporate counsel and valuation experts to assist in carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities. Article 2 then closed with its own version of the same promise: to take up the board and special committee directly, how one gets formed and staffed, what it should expect from the advisors it hires, and how all of that squares with a court’s own, independent view of value in a later appraisal fight. Both promises are the spine of what follows, and this article starts before the committee ever meets, with the question of who is even in the room.
The vantage points behind this article
I come at this article from several different chairs, and I want to be upfront about which one carries the most weight below.
As a CPA and ABV, I have been the valuation professional a board or special committee retains to tell it what something is worth. Separately, I have been the fairness opinion provider retained to tell that same board whether a negotiated price is fair, from a financial point of view, to the shareholders on the other side of the transaction. I did both jobs for Athlon Sports Communications, Inc.’s board before its 2012 merger, and I did the fairness opinion job for National Health Realty, Inc.’s special committee in its 2006 going private merger into National HealthCare Corporation, working alongside the special committee’s own outside counsel and relying, as any financial advisor must, on that counsel’s advice for the legal questions embedded in the engagement.1
But the vantage point I want to give the most weight to in this article is different from either of those. I have also been a director myself, and a special committee chair or member in my own right, not merely the advisor hired to help one. As a principal and senior executive in the venture capital and merchant banking industries, I have served on corporate boards, chaired or served on special committees, and chaired executive, compensation, audit, and investment committees. That is the chair from which I have felt selection decisions from the inside, staffing a committee, weighing who else belongs in the room, and living with the consequences of getting that right or wrong, rather than simply advising on it from outside.
Finally, I have been a venture capital and private equity investor with a stake in companies where I was relying on someone else’s board or special committee, and someone else’s valuation and fairness work, to protect my own economic interest in a sale, recapitalization, or squeeze-out. A valuation or fairness opinion provider tends to think about process from the outside, as the advisor doing the work. A director and committee chair or member thinks about it from the inside, as the person staffing that process and living inside it. An investor with money on the table thinks about the same process from further outside still, as the person who has to decide whether to trust it. Article 3 draws on all of these chairs, but the director and special committee experience is doing most of the work in the selection section that follows.
The levels of fairness a special committee actually has to manage
Before getting to selection, it is worth laying out everything “fairness,” procedurally, actually requires, because the term gets used loosely and the layers get run together. A board or special committee handling a conflicted or third party transaction has to get right, more or less simultaneously:
- Formation fairness. Who is on the committee, how independent they are, and when and how the committee’s authority was created, relative to the deal terms.
- Empowerment fairness. Whether the committee actually has the power to say no, to hire and fire its own advisors, and to negotiate, rather than simply ratifying a deal management has already agreed to.
- Process fairness, sometimes called fair dealing. How the negotiation actually ran: timing, disclosure among directors, who talked to whom, and whether the committee had a genuine seat at the table from the start.
- Price fairness, sometimes called fair price. Whether the economic terms, tested against the valuation and fairness work the committee commissioned, fall within a defensible range.
- Disclosure fairness. What shareholders were actually told before they voted, and whether that summary fairly represented the advisor’s work without needing to reproduce every underlying number.
- Standard of review fairness. Which legal standard a court will apply after the fact, ordinary business judgment, enhanced scrutiny, or entire fairness, because that choice depends heavily on how the first four items were handled.
- Reconciliation fairness. How a board’s fair process squares, or does not need to square, with a court’s own independent fair value finding if dissenting shareholders later pursue appraisal.
Selection sits underneath every one of those layers. Get the wrong people in the room, or empower them incorrectly, and nothing downstream, however careful the valuation or however polished the fairness opinion, fully repairs it.
Selecting the people who will decide
This is the section I feel most strongly about, because I have watched it done well and done poorly from three different chairs.
Borrow the public company playbook, even when you do not have to. Private companies are under no legal obligation to follow the independence standards that Nasdaq, the NYSE, or the SEC impose on listed issuers.2 These standards require decision making by a disinterested and independent director free of disqualifying relationships, and public disclosure of which standard the board used to reach that conclusion. None of that binds a privately held company as a matter of law. I have nonetheless encouraged private company boards and controlling shareholders, more than once, to adopt that same disciplined, criteria based approach voluntarily, because a disinterested director selected against an objective standard is a materially different thing than a friendly director selected because the CEO trusts them. When a transaction has any conflict at all, a founder selling to a family member, a controlling shareholder taking the company private, a recapitalization that treats one class of holders differently than another, the question a plaintiff’s lawyer or a skeptical investor will ask first is not whether the board acted in good faith. It is who exactly was on the committee, and how they got there.
Add the disinterested voice, even if you cannot fully replicate a public board. For companies too small or too closely held to recruit an entirely independent board, I have advised bringing in outside, disinterested perspective in one of two forms. The first is an actual director, someone added to the formal board with a vote, with standing to serve on or chair a special committee, and with the full fiduciary duty that comes with the seat. The second is an outside board advisor, sometimes called an advisory director, someone who sits in the room, reviews the same materials, and offers the same candid pushback, but without a formal board seat or a vote. Both have real value, but the difference is not a technicality: an advisory board provides non-binding advice, and its members are not held to the same legal standard as directors who carry fiduciary duties.3 Depending on the terms of the engagement, an outside board advisor may still have fiduciary duties, but they are the duties of an agent, on the same footing as those a lawyer, accountant, or financial advisor owes the board, rather than the duties of a director. An outside board advisor can widen the range of experience in the room and can be added quickly, without the governance friction of a formal board seat, but that person’s judgment is not a substitute for a fiduciary director’s judgment, and should never be presented to a court, a minority shareholder, or an investor as if it were.
Build a strong professional team, but do not mistake the team for the fiduciary. A well-selected committee should surround itself with real expertise: outside corporate counsel, a valuation and fairness opinion advisor, and, depending on the deal, tax, industry, or regulatory specialists. In my own committee work, that team regularly extended beyond general corporate counsel to include specialized regulatory or intellectual property counsel, because the underlying business could not be fairly evaluated without that expertise in the room. A strong team, however large it gets, can materially improve the quality of a committee’s decision. But it is important to be precise about who actually answers for that decision. The professionals on the team owe the committee competence, diligence, and adherence to their own professional standards, under contract and under the rules of their profession. They do not, in the ordinary case, owe the shareholders a fiduciary duty. Only the person who holds the seat, actual director, does. That distinction is not academic; a credentialed team and a documented process record still are not a substitute for a director’s own exercise of independent judgment.4 A director who simply defers to a well-credentialed advisor without exercising independent judgment has not discharged the duty that only the director holds. The team informs the decision. It does not make the decision, and it cannot be blamed for the decision in the director’s place.
Weigh experience deliberately, not just independence. Independence answers whether a director can be trusted to decide freely. It does not answer whether that director has the background to evaluate what is put in front of them. A committee reviewing a complex valuation, a fairness opinion, and a negotiated deal structure benefits from at least one member who has actually read one of these documents before, whether that experience comes from a finance, accounting, investment, or transactional legal background. Both formation fairness and empowerment fairness depend on getting this balance right.
A current, real proxy statement to use as a reference tool
Everything in the section above is a framework. It is easier to use once you have seen what it looks like when a real board actually applies it, in a filing any director reader can pull up and read start to finish. Marchex, Inc.’s definitive proxy statement for its 2026 acquisition of Archenia, Inc. is a clean, current, publicly available illustration.5 I am citing it exactly as that, an illustration to read alongside your own counsel’s guidance on your own transaction, not as legal analysis, and not as a template to copy without review.
The fact pattern will look familiar: the sellers of the target company included Marchex’s own Chairman and Vice Chairman, so the deal carried the same kind of conflict this article has been discussing. The proxy’s “Background of the Transaction” section states, in one sentence, why and on what terms the committee was formed: “the Board formed the Special Committee, comprised of the three independent directors of the Company, to consider the proposal and any other proposals the Company may receive from third parties, including to negotiate terms, reject the proposal, and make recommendations to the Board.” Formation and mandate, stated together.
Advisor sequencing in the filing follows the same order described below under “Sequencing: who hires whom, and why it matters.” Independent legal counsel was retained first, the same day the committee was formed: “DLA Piper LLP (US) … was engaged to advise the Special Committee in connection with the proposal.” The financial advisor came later, once counsel and the committee had already framed the deal: “On December 5, 2025, the Special Committee engaged Craig-Hallum as its financial advisor, to render a fairness opinion regarding the transaction.” The proxy then documents the committee’s procedural steps in dated detail, repeated meetings with counsel to negotiate terms, specific instructions to counsel on deal points, a diligence review with company management, and a final vote to approve the transaction and recommend it to the full board, at which point, in the proxy’s own words, “the Special Committee comprised a majority of the Board and … the other two members of the Board are Sellers who must recuse themselves from deliberations regarding the Transaction.” Closing is also conditioned on what the filing defines as the “Majority of the Minority Vote,” approval by stockholders excluding the shares held by the two conflicted sellers, the same protection this article and MFW, discussed next, both treat as central.
Use it the way I do: as a real record of what a committee’s own paper trail should be able to show, who was on it, why, when, what it was actually empowered to do, and in what order it retained its advisors, rather than as a substitute for counsel’s judgment about what your committee’s own transaction requires.
The clearest legal framework tying selection to outcome
Delaware’s statutory blueprint for controller and other conflicted transactions now starts with the newly revamped version of Delaware General Corporation Law Section 144.6 The recently amended Section 144 substantially codifies, but in some respects deviates from, the Delaware Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., and because Section 144 is a statute it supervenes MFW where the two are inconsistent.7 The practical picture, however, is close to the one MFW drew and close to the Marchex record above: a controller transaction stands on firmer ground when an independent special committee, empowered to hire its own advisors and say no, negotiates the price and a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the minority shareholders separately approves the deal, though the actual doctrinal test under Section 144 and its interaction with MFW have more moving parts than that summary, and Delaware’s rules in this area continue to evolve. Every part of it is a selection or process question, not a valuation question, which is exactly why it belongs in an article about who is in the room. Tennessee does not appear to have adopted this framework as such, though deal counsel often treat its protections as a practical benchmark even outside Delaware. Exactly how Section 144 and the MFW line would apply to a given committee’s facts, and what the current law actually requires, is a legal judgment that belongs entirely with qualified corporate counsel, not with this article. What I can say from the chairs I have sat in is narrower and more practical: I have never met a plaintiff’s lawyer, or a skeptical minority investor, who would not ask some version of these same questions regardless of which state’s law technically governs.
Sequencing: who hires whom, and why it matters
Once the committee is formed, the order in which it retains its advisors is not a formality. The committee should retain its own outside counsel first, and that counsel typically should not be the company’s regular outside counsel, since the goal is to avoid even the appearance that the committee’s advice is filtered through relationships built to serve management or the controlling shareholder.8 Committee counsel then typically helps retain the valuation and fairness opinion advisor, in part because counsel can help structure that engagement and its communications in a way that protects privilege where privilege is available, a fact-specific question that counsel, not this article, should answer. This is exactly the structure I worked inside: an independent financial advisor engaged for the committee, coordinating with, and relying on for legal questions, the committee’s own outside counsel, rather than management’s.
Both Delaware and Tennessee statutory law give directors a real, if conditional, benefit for following this sequence carefully: protection for a director who reasonably relies on information and opinions prepared by counsel or by public accountants believed to be competent and reliable, with Tennessee’s statute naming public accountants expressly, on equal footing with legal counsel.9 That protection depends on the director actually exercising judgment about who to rely on and how, not on simply retaining a name-brand advisor and asking no further questions. The exact scope of that statutory protection is a question for counsel, not for this article.
What the committee should expect from its advisors
Before accepting a valuation conclusion or a fairness opinion, a director or special committee member should be prepared to ask, and to keep asking through the engagement:
- Who exactly is issuing the opinion, and is that same provider also acting as the transaction’s deal advisor?
- What other relationships, past or expected, does the provider have with the company, the buyer, or the seller?
- Is any portion of the fee contingent on the deal closing, and if so, what portion?
- What valuation methodologies were used, who developed the underlying management projections, and what changes were made to them along the way?
- What assumptions matter most to the conclusion, and what alternatives did the advisor actually consider before landing on this deal?
- What information was independently verified, versus simply supplied by management and relied upon?
- What is the resulting valuation range, and where does the negotiated consideration fall within it?
- What are the most important weaknesses or uncertainties in the analysis?
- Is the opinion limited to financial fairness, and if so, what does it deliberately not address?
- Could the provider reasonably expect future business from either side of the transaction?
- What happens to the engagement, and the fee, if the deal does not close?
- What records, drafts, and underlying work papers will the advisor retain, in case any of this needs to be reconstructed later?
A committee that has genuinely worked through that list, and can show that it did, has done most of what formation and empowerment fairness require. A committee that outsources the list itself to the advisor has not.
Legitimate reasons to accept less than the highest number
Outside the Revlon setting, a well-selected, well-advised committee is not required to chase the single highest headline price, and it is worth being direct about that, because directors sometimes assume otherwise. That qualifier matters: once the sale or breakup of the firm is a fait accompli, Revlon duties attach and the board’s role becomes one of an auctioneer seeking the highest value reasonably available. Short of that, in an actual sale of control, Delaware law generally asks the board to pursue the best value reasonably available to shareholders, not mechanically the highest nominal number, and the case law lets a board weigh financing risk, deal certainty, and the real value of non-cash consideration alongside price, without being bound to run an auction, shop the company, or follow a single blueprint. Counsel should confirm what that standard requires on a given set of facts. Employment base and workforce continuity sit in a narrower category, and generally only justify a lower price outside of an actual sale of control; Tennessee has an adjacent statute here too, but it is a liability shield for resisting an unwanted takeover, not a mandate that reaches a board’s voluntary choice to accept a lower price in a friendly deal, and no Tennessee appellate decision has extended it that far. As with the MFW framework above, this is Delaware doctrine offered as persuasive guidance for a Tennessee company’s committee, not binding law, and exactly how far it extends on any particular set of facts is a question for counsel, not a conclusion this article can reach for you.
Testing the market, or working from the deal already on the table
Not every fairness opinion is built the same way underneath. In some engagements, the committee or its banker actually canvasses the market before or after signing, a defined set of strategic and financial buyers contacted directly, or through an investment bank running a structured process, to see whether a better price is actually available rather than simply assumed to be available. In others, no live canvass happens at all, and the fairness opinion rests instead on market-based valuation methodologies, comparable public company multiples and precedent transaction data, benchmarking the negotiated price against what the market has paid for similar businesses rather than against actual competing bids for this one.
Both approaches can support a fair opinion. Delaware law does not require an auction or a market check as a matter of course, and I have worked on transactions where a genuine market test was run, and others where it deliberately was not, for reasons that had nothing to do with cutting corners. Time constraints are the most common reason: a financing deadline, a distressed seller running out of cash, or a counterparty unwilling to sign anything less than a tight exclusivity period can make a multi-week canvass impractical. Confidentiality risk is the other recurring reason, particularly in defense, government contracting, and other regulated or relationship-driven industries, where word that a company is for sale can unsettle customers, jeopardize security clearances or contract eligibility, or trigger competitor and employee reactions before a deal is even signed. A controlled process, sometimes a single, carefully selected buyer, sometimes a short go-shop window after signing with a step-down termination fee, can be the more defensible choice in those circumstances, not a lesser one.
What changes is the set of questions a director or committee member needs to ask. If a market check was run, the committee should know who was contacted and who was deliberately excluded, on what basis, whether contact went through counsel or the banker directly, what confidentiality protections were in place before sharing information, and whether a go-shop period actually produced a competing indication or simply expired unused. If no market check was run, the committee should be able to say why not, and should have pressed the advisor on what market-based data stood in for a live test, comparable companies, precedent transactions, or both, and whether that data was current and genuinely comparable rather than convenient. A committee that can answer either set of questions, whichever path it took, has done the work. A committee that never asked which path it was on has not.
A fair process is not a guarantee of the appraisal number
The final layer, reconciliation fairness, is the one committees most often misunderstand, and it connects directly back to where this series started with Athlon. A court can find that a board’s process was entirely fair, that a board’s committee was well selected, that the parties had real bargaining power, and that the advisors were careful, and still have a separate appraisal proceeding land on a different, sometimes higher, fair value number for dissenting shareholders. Delaware case law treats these as genuinely separate questions: an older line of appraisal cases establishes that once the fairness of the process is not in dispute, the court’s own job is to value what was actually taken from the shareholder on its own terms, and a more recent line of deal price cases confirms this can cut in either direction, sometimes landing above the negotiated price, sometimes below it, even where the sale process itself looked reliable. A well-selected, well-run committee protects the board and gives shareholders a defensible process. It does not, and is not meant to, guarantee that a later court applying its own independent valuation methodology, the very question Article 1 of this series covered in Athlon, will land on the identical number.
Where this leaves a director, and where it leaves an investor
The thread running through all three articles in this series is the same: fairness is not one thing. It is a valuation methodology question, a definitional question about what an opinion actually says, and, in this article, a selection and process question about who gets to decide and how. As an investor relying on someone else’s committee, I read a proxy statement or a merger agreement looking for exactly the markers in this article: an independent committee formed before terms were set, real authority to say no, its own advisors, and a documented record of having asked the hard questions rather than simply accepted an answer. As a valuation and fairness opinion professional, I have tried to be the kind of advisor that record can actually rely on. And as someone who has now written all three of these roles down for the first time, I am more convinced than when I started that the single most important decision in any conflicted transaction is made before the first valuation model is ever built: who is in the room, and on what terms.
AAcknowledgments: I am grateful to Joan MacLeod Heminway, J.D. (UT Winston College of Law), and Paul S. Davidson, J.D., LL.M. (Holland & Knight), for their review and feedback across this series. Any remaining errors are mine alone. In this article in particular, the legal citations and doctrinal framing reflect Mr. Davidson's review, and the academic and governance framing reflects Professor Heminway's review, including the framing of the Delaware General Corporation Law § 144 discussion; views expressed remain the author's.
Michael E. Collins, CPA, ABV, CFF, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Series 7, 63, 79 (investment banking / M&A representative), and 24 (all Retired), is the managing member of Expert of Counsel, PLLC in Franklin, Tennessee. He served as the valuation and fairness-opinion advisor to Athlon Sports Communications, Inc.’s board prior to its 2012 merger, and later as Athlon’s testifying valuation expert in the statutory appraisal proceeding that produced Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Duggan. He has also served as a director and special committee chair or member for other companies.
© 2026 Michael E. Collins. All rights reserved.
Footnotes
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Fairness Opinion of 2nd Generation Capital, LLC, Annex E to National Health Realty, Inc.’s Definitive Merger Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filed August 7, 2007. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047334/000095014407007415/g06278dmdefm14a.htm
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Nasdaq Listing Rule 5605, Board Composition and Committee Requirements, in the Nasdaq Rulebook, Rule 5600; Item 407 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/229.407
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Boardio, “Advisory Board vs Board of Directors.” https://www.boardio.com/blog/advisory-board-vs-board-of-directors-whats-the-difference-3466; Cerius Executives, “Advisory Board vs. Board of Directors.” https://ceriusexecutives.com/an-advisory-board-vs-board-directors-whats-difference/
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Chesemore v. Alliance Holdings, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (W.D. Wis. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding the process behind an ESOP fairness opinion deficient notwithstanding the credentialed valuation team’s hours of work on the engagement). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-3181/14-3181-2016-07-21.html
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Marchex, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (DEFM14A), filed June 5, 2026, re: acquisition of Archenia, Inc. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1224133/000207709626000195/ea0292048-02.htm
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Delaware General Corporation Law Section 144, as amended by Senate Bill 21 (2025). https://law.justia.com/codes/delaware/title-8/chapter-1/subchapter-iv/section-144/
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Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2014/334-2013.html
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See generally Demand Review Committees and Privilege Considerations in Internal Investigations, Directors & Boards, discussing the formation of special committees and privilege considerations arising from their engagements with counsel. https://www.directorsandboards.com/board-issues/internal-investigations/demand-review-committees-and-privilege-considerations-in-internal-investigations/
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Delaware General Corporation Law Section 141(e); Tennessee Code Annotated Section 48-18-301(b).
