What a Sports-Magazine Buyout Taught Tennessee About “Fair”Part 1 of a 3-part series on the Fairness Doctrine in corporate transactions
A lecture, and a case that keeps teaching
On August 24, 2026, I stood in front of a class at the University of Tennessee's Winston College of Law to talk about a case most of the students had never heard of: Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Duggan, 549 S.W.3d 107 (Tenn. 2018). It is not a famous case outside Tennessee corporate-law circles. Nobody outside Nashville media and financial-advisory circles remembers Athlon as anything more than the company behind those glossy college-football preview magazines that used to show up on newsstands every August. But for anyone who has ever had to answer the question "what is this stock actually worth, and is this deal fair to the people being squeezed out of it?" Athlon is required reading.
Preparing for that lecture forced me to revisit a case I had lived inside of for years, first as the valuation professional who informed Athlon's board what its stock was worth before the transaction closed, and later as the testifying expert defending that valuation through a trial, an appeal, and a trip to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Reworking those slides eight years after the Supreme Court's opinion reminded me how much Athlon changed, and how much it deliberately left unresolved. That gap between what changed and what did not is where this series starts.
A colleague, a classroom, and a full-circle nomination
The August 24 invitation was not a one-off. It came from Joan MacLeod Heminway, Director of the Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law and the Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law at UT's Winston College of Law, who has invited me back to guest-lecture in her business law class almost every year since we first met on a panel discussing fairness before the Knoxville Inns of Court, years before the Tennessee Supreme Court ever took up Athlon. That panel turned into a standing invitation, and the standing invitation turned into a genuine friendship built on a shared interest in educating future legal and valuation professionals.
That friendship has gone in both directions. As an alumnus and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Army War College Foundation, I had the opportunity to nominate Joan as a civilian for the National Security Seminar (“NSS”) at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. She attended the program’s 2026 session, an experience she wrote about after arriving in Carlisle. It is a small reminder that the fairness bar in Tennessee is a small world, and that relationships built on law-school panels and classroom visits tend to outlast any single case.
The company behind the case
Athlon’s own story is a good example of why "fairness" disputes so often arrive at the worst possible moment in a company’s life. Jerry McCoin founded Athlon in Nashville in 1967 as a Southeastern Conference football preview magazine, and the company was incorporated as Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. in 1972. Nashville businessman Spencer Hays acquired control in the early 1980s and held it until his death in 2017, steering Athlon from a seasonal print publisher into a broader sports-media business.
The event that produced the litigation was a 2010 growth bet. Athlon hired Stephen Duggan, a CPA and publishing executive, to launch a national monthly newspaper insert under the Athlon Sports brand. Duggan invested $1.5 million for a 15% stake and the chance to earn more through EBITDA targets. The insert was launched in October 2010 at a seven-million-copy rate base and grew past nine million copies in 2011: genuine circulation success. But advertising revenue never caught up to the circulation numbers, cash flow tightened, and by late 2011 Athlon had sold its headquarters building, retired its line of credit, became solely supported by personal loans from Spencer Hays, and cut employee pay just to keep operating. Duggan resigned as president and CEO in November 2011.
Facing continued financial strain, Athlon’s board authorized a 2012 recapitalization merger to raise $2 million in new capital. Duggan and two other shareholders were not invited into the new entity and elected to dissent rather than be cashed out on the board’s terms. That decision (to dissent instead of accepting the offered price) is what turned an ordinary recapitalization into a six-year statutory appraisal fight, and it is the reason a regional sports-publishing company ended up rewriting a piece of Tennessee corporate law.
Two roles, one number
I came into the Athlon story before the merger, not after the lawsuit. Athlon’s board and its directors asked 2nd Generation Capital, the merchant and investment banking firm I led at the time, to do two connected but distinct jobs: determine the fair value of the company’s equity for purposes of the recapitalization and separately render a fairness opinion on whether the proposed merger terms were fair, from a financial standpoint, to the shareholders being cashed out. Those are not the same question. A valuation answers, "what is this worth?" A fairness opinion answers, "given everything the board knew, was the process and the price defensible?" Boards and special committees rely on outside advisors precisely because directors need an independent, defensible answer to both questions before they vote, and because plaintiffs’ counsel will pick apart both answers if the deal ever gets to appraisal litigation.
My valuation concluded that Athlon’s equity was worth effectively nothing on a going-concern basis at the time of the merger: "$NIL" is the word the courts later used. I also opined that the merger consideration then under discussion was fair to shareholders from a financial standpoint. The board relied on both conclusions, and Athlon ultimately paid the dissenting shareholders $0.10 per share plus interest, a figure the dissenters rejected, demanding instead $6.18 per share. That roughly sixty-fold gap between what the company paid and what the dissenters demanded is what a Davidson County chancery court, and eventually the Tennessee Supreme Court, had to resolve.
When the case went to trial in 2015, I was retained again, this time as Athlon’s testifying valuation expert in the statutory appraisal proceeding, working closely with Athlon’s outside counsel, Paul Davidson of Holland & Knight, to defend the original conclusion against a competing expert, Jaime C. d’Almeida of Duff & Phelps, LLC, who valued the dissenters’ shares at $6.09 to $7.16 per share. The Chancery Court, after a six-day trial, adopted my valuation determinations "for the most part" and rejected the opposing expert’s report and testimony in their entirety, while making one adjustment: the court found that the $0.10 per share actually paid was itself the fair value, rather than a literal zero.
A two-track valuation, built for an appeal
Davidson and I did not think Delaware Block would survive scrutiny forever, and we assumed early on that whichever side lost at trial would appeal. Tennessee was, by then, the only state still requiring appraisers to use the Delaware Block framework, and both of us believed it was out of step with how most states and the appraisal profession itself valued closely held companies. I followed Delaware Block because the trial court required it, but I said so plainly in my report: the method is generally regarded as outdated and less reliable than the income, market, and asset approaches used in modern valuation practice.
So, I gave the court two valuations instead of one. The first followed Delaware Block exactly as Tennessee law then demanded. The second applied the methods modern appraisal practice would use instead. Both arrived at the same answer: Athlon’s equity was worth effectively nothing either way. Informing and educating the court on that point is part of an expert’s job, and putting both analyses into the record gave Davidson a solid basis in the trial record to defend the result on appeal no matter which methodology ultimately controlled. The strategy worked as intended: when the Tennessee Supreme Court later freed trial courts to use any generally accepted valuation method, the underlying finding of value did not have to change, because it had never depended on Delaware Block being the only right answer.
What the courts actually decided
The procedural path matters because it explains why Athlon became a landmark case about method, not about money.
The Chancery Court applied the Delaware Block method (a formula that blends market value, asset value, and earnings value into a weighted average) because Tennessee precedent, principally Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983), was understood to require it. Applying that method to the facts, the trial court found Athlon’s shares were worth $0.10 each as of the merger date and affirmed that finding after weighing both experts’ testimony, Athlon’s own overly optimistic internal forecasts (the court, adopting my testimony language, called them "puffery"), and evidence that the company was in the "zone of insolvency" at the time.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in 2016, holding that Tennessee law required the Delaware Block method and that the trial court had applied it correctly, without being "rote" about it. The intermediate court noted, as I had testified, that Delaware itself had moved away from mandatory use of the Delaware Block method in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), but concluded that only the Tennessee Supreme Court could make that same move for Tennessee.
That is exactly what happened next. In its June 2018 opinion, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review specifically to decide "the methods by which a trial court may determine the ‘fair value’ of the shares of a dissenting shareholder." The Court held that Blasingame had never actually mandated the Delaware Block method as a matter of law, but to the extent lower courts had read it that way, the Court overruled Blasingame on that point and adopted Weinberger’s more flexible standard: trial courts may use any valuation technique or method generally accepted in the financial community and admissible in court, including forward-looking approaches such as discounted cash flow, so long as the projected values are provable as of the valuation date and not speculative. Because the trial court’s original order suggested it may have felt legally constrained to use Delaware Block exclusively, the Supreme Court vacated the valuation determination and remanded, not to change the answer, but to make sure the trial court reached its answer under the corrected legal standard.
It is worth being precise about what the Supreme Court did not do. It did not decide that the shares were worth $6.18, $0.10, or any other figure. That judgment belonged to the trial court on remand, and the trial court again arrived at $0.10 per share, applying the same underlying evidence and reasoning now unconstrained by any assumed Delaware Block mandate.
Why this is a "fairness" case, not just a valuation case
Here is the point I wanted the UT students to sit with: Athlon is remembered as a valuation-methodology case, but the underlying dispute at every stage was really about fairness: fairness of the process by which minority shareholders got cashed out, and fairness of the number they got cashed out at. Delaware Block was never really a valuation theory; it was a legal guardrail meant to keep courts from rubber-stamping whatever number a controlling shareholder’s side put forward, at a time when discounted cash flow and other modern techniques were viewed with suspicion as too speculative or too manipulable. When the Tennessee Supreme Court freed trial courts to use any generally accepted method, it did not make fairness disputes easier to resolve; if anything, it made the "battle of the experts" more consequential, because the outcome now turns even more heavily on whose assumptions, data, and methodology the trial judge finds credible.
That shift has not been revisited since. As of 2026, Tennessee’s dissenters’-rights statute, Tenn. Code Ann. Title 48, Chapter 23, has not been substantively amended since 2016, before Athlon was even decided. What changed was judicial interpretation, not statutory text, and no subsequent Tennessee Supreme Court decision has narrowed or revisited Athlon. It remains controlling precedent on valuation methodology in Tennessee fair-value disputes, whether those disputes arise from a corporate freeze-out merger, a family business buyout, or (as I have advised on in other engagements) a pre-transaction fairness opinion meant to head off exactly this kind of litigation before it starts.
That last point is where this series is headed. Article 1 has been about how a Nashville sports-media company’s cash crunch became the case that modernized Tennessee’s approach to valuation methodology in dissenters’-rights disputes. Article 2 will discuss just what is a fairness opinion, how it is used and why. Article 3 will turn to the role of special committees and how they utilize corporate counsel and valuation experts to assist in carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities.
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Joan MacLeod Heminway, J.D. (UT Winston College of Law), and Paul S. Davidson, J.D., LL.M. (Holland & Knight), for their review and feedback across this series. Any remaining errors are mine alone. In this article in particular, responsibility for the legal citations and doctrinal framing remain the author's.
Michael E. Collins, CPA, ABV, CFF, is the managing member of Expert of Counsel, PLLC in Franklin, Tennessee. He served as the valuation and fairness-opinion advisor to Athlon Sports Communications, Inc.’s board prior to its 2012 merger, and later as Athlon’s testifying valuation expert in the statutory appraisal proceeding that produced Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Duggan, 549 S.W.3d 107 (Tenn. 2018).
© 2026 Michael E. Collins. All rights reserved.
Case citations referenced
- Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Duggan, 549 S.W.3d 107 (Tenn. 2018)
- Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Duggan, No. M2015-02222-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 6087667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2016)
- Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983)
- Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)
- Tenn. Code Ann. Title 48, Chapter 23 (Dissenters’ Rights)
